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RECENT DECISIONS
Millan, supra. A refusal to let the true owner remove his property from the
custodian's land was held to be a conversion by the North Carolina court, Nichols
v. Newsom, 6 N.C. 302 (1813), and not a conversion by the Indiana court.
Chicago L & L. Ry. Co. v. Pope, 99 Ind. App. 280, 188 N.E. 594 (1934). In both
cases the goods were on the land through no fault of their owner.
An absolute refusal to deliver property known to be the property of the
claimant was not a conversion, according to a New Hampshire decision, when
the claimant could reasonably infer from the circumstances and from the acts
of the defendant that refusal, though absolute in form, was in fact meant to
be qualified. Stahl v. Boston & M. R. R., 71 N.H. 57, 51 Atl. 176 (1901).
The rightful custodian of property may refuse to deliver it until he has had
a reasonable time to determine its ownership. Twenty-four hours was held te
be a reasonable time in a Michigan case. Fletcher v. McMillan, supra. Twelve
days was held reasonable in a Rhode Island case, Buffington v. Clarke, supra,
twenty-two days, in a Missouri decision, St. Louis Fixture & Show Case Co. v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 232 Mo. App. 10, 88 S.W. (2d) 254 (1935), and thirty
days was a reasonable time in a Nebraska controversy. Farming Corporation et
al. v. Bridgeport Bank, 113 Neb. 323, 202 N.W. 911 (1925). If the refusal is un-
reasonably prolonged, it is a conversion, Bufington v. Clarke, supra, but in such
cases where defendant's conduct has been held a conversion, the decisions have
frequently been based on grounds other than the length of time during which
the defendant held the property after the demand. Flannery v. Brewer, supra;
Obodov v. Foster, supra. WILLIAM J. SLOAN.
Fixtures-Effect of a New Lease on Agreement Between Landlord and
Tenant to Consider a Fixture as Personal Property of the Tenant.-Under an
agreement in a lease, a warehouse erected on the property of the landlord by
the tenant was to remain the personal property of the tenant. After this original
lease expired the tenant was given a new lease which did not by its terms reserve
this right of removal to the tenant, who wished to move and take his warehouse
with him. The landlord sought an injunction restraining the tenant from remov-
ing the warehouse, contending that title to the warehouse vested in him upon the
expiration of the first lease. Held, that this occupancy of the premises by the
tenant constituted one continuous tenancy and the new lease was intended merely
to provide for further occupancy of the premises. The mere execution of a
new lease should not change the ownership of property under a continuous
tenancy. Scriven v. Bailey, 290 N.W. 486 (S.D. 1940).
The holding in this case is contrary to what is known as the majority or
forfeiture rule, but it is indicative of the modern trend to depart from the older
and more artificial rule.
A resident of Illinois, a state which still adheres to the forfeiture rule, built
a barn and stables on land held by him under a lease. When this lease expired
a new one was entered into which contained no provision for the removal of
these barns and stables at the termination of the tenancy. The question arose
as to who was entitled to recover the value of these structures on a condemna-
tion proceeding. It was held that the acceptance of the new lease without the
reservation of the right to remove in effect acknowledged the right of the land-
lord to the fixtures and that the tenant was estopped from denying this right.
Sanitary District of Chicago v. Cook, 169 11. 184, 48 N.E. 461 (1897).
Under a set of facts similar to those in the principal case, a court in a
jurisdiction applying the forfeiture rule held that the acceptance of the new
lease on different terms was the creation of a new tenancy, which was to be
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governed by the covenants, conditions, and reservations contained in the new
lease, and since the new lease did not contain the reservation of the right of
removal the tenant was treated as having abandoned his right to remove. Hed-
derick v. Smith, 103 Ind. 203, 2 N.E. 315 (1885).
Where a tenant under a year to year tenancy had the right to remove trade
fixtures installed by him later accepted a written lease which did not mention
this right, the court held that at the acceptance of the lease the title to the fix-
tures vested in the landlord as part of the realty since the right to remove is
a privilege and not an absolute right. Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478, 13 At. 370
(1888).
Maryland has, however, changed the effect of this decision by statute.
According to the statute "the right of a tenant to remove fixtures erected by
him under one demise or term shall not be lost or in any manner impaired by
reason of his acceptance of the same premises without any intermediate sur-
render of possession." Code (1898) Art. 53, sec. 27. This statute amounts to a
statement of the rule in those states which apply the non-forfeiture theory.
Second National Bank of Beloit v. Merrill Co., 69 Wis. 501, 34 N.W. 514 (1887) ;
Springs et al. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 205 N.C. 444, 171 S.E. 635 (1933) ; Blake-
McFall Co. v. Wilson et al., 98 Ore. 626, 193 Pac. 202 (1920) ; Curran et al. v.
Curran et al., 289 N.W. 418 (S.D. 1939); Sassen v. Haegle, 125 Minn. 441, 147
N.W. 445 (1914).
When Cooley, J. was asked to apply the majority rule in an early Michigan
case he said, "There is no reason of public policy to sustain such doctrine. What
could possibly be more absurd than a rule of law which would in effect say to a
tenant who is about to obtain a renewal: 'If you will be at the expense and
trouble, and incur the loss, of removing your erections during the term, and of
afterwards bringing them back again, they will be yours; otherwise you will be
deemed to abandon them to your landlord.'" Kerr v. Kingsbury, 39 Mich. 150,
33 Am. Rep. 362 (1878). The foregoing quotation from Cooley, J. is cited with
approval and followed in the following cases: Second National Bank of Beloit
v. 0. E. Merrill Co., 69 Wis. 501, 34 N.W. 514 (1887); Sassen v. Haegle, 125
Minn. 441, 147 N.W. 445 (1914) ; and Blake-McFall Co. v. Wilson et al., 98 Ore.
626, 193 Pac. 902 (1920).
The original lease with the holder of a life estate in property gave to the
tenant the right of removal of those fixtures placed on the property by the
tenant. When the life estate ended and the lease expired the tenant remained
on the property with the consent of the remainderman. Later when the tenant
desired to move and to take the fixtures with him the remainderman refused,
saying that the tenant's lease with the holder of the life estate ended at the
death of this holder and that the tenant held under an oral contract, and that
the terms of the original lease were not binding on him. The court held that
there was a new oral lease but that as long as the tenant continued in possession
with the consent of the new landlord his right of removal remained, in the
absence of any special provision to the contrary. Ray v. Young, 160 Iowa 613,
142 N.W. 393 (1913).
In a Wisconsin case where the tenant first held under an oral lease which
reserved to him the title to such fixtures as he should put on the property but
where the subsequent lease was written and did not contain this reservation, the
court held that the intention of the parties at the time of attaching the fixures
is controlling, and that the acceptance of a new lease omitting to provide for the
fixtures does not constitute an abandonment of the reservation. Shields v. Han-
sen, 201 Wis. 349, 230 N.W. 51 (1930).
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